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Contemporary Pragmatism (forthcoming)

A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism
Justin Remhof
Old Dominion University
Abstract: The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to
know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed
illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism
inspired by C. S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better
Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know
whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. Although
it will emerge that this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical
skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.
Keywords: Peirce, pragmatism, skepticism, knowledge, truth, justification
1. Introduction
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know
because my lived experiences are indistinguishable from the hypothetical scenario that I am
merely being fed the impression of having those experiences. On this hypothesis, I have no
evidence for or against the possibility of being fed the illusion that, for instance, I have two
hands. Hence, I do not know that I have two hands—or even fingers, toes, and so forth.
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired
by C. S. Peirce.1 Peirce’s pragmatic theory of inquiry and his trenchant criticism of Cartesian
doubt are familiar even to those who are faintly acquainted with American pragmatism. This
essay first explores Erick Olsson’s influential Peircean response to the radical skeptic. Olsson
argues that we can use Peirce’s philosophical framework to deny the skeptic’s premises that we
do not know that we are not systematically deceived. I argue that Olsson’s Peircean response to
the radical skeptic fails, and that a better Peircean response turns on the falsification of a
different premise the skeptic embraces. The Peircean account I develop holds that, although I do
not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I sill know what I ordinarily claim to know.
1

See Friedman (1999); Olsson (2005a), (2005b); Hookway (2008).

The implication is that I can retain knowledge of commonsense propositions despite the
possibility of deception.

2. The Radical Skeptical Argument
The problem of radical skepticism can be posed as follows. Let S be any skeptical
hypothesis similar to the systematic illusion scenario. Let O be some proposition I claim to know
which is incompatible with S. O could be the proposition that I have two hands. O propositions
are those nearly everyone believes which are often taken for granted. The radical skeptical
argument is as follows:
S1. I do not know not-S.
S2. If I do not know not-S, then I do not know O.
S3. So, I do not know O.
The argument is valid and S1 and S2 seem true. S1 appears true because I have no evidence for
or against the possibility that all my experiences are artificially generated. S2 appears true
because if I know that I have two hands, for example, I know that I am not being deceived about
whether I have two hands. If I do not know whether I am being deceived, however, I do not
know I have two hands. S3 follows: I do not know I have two hands.

3. Olsson’s First Peircean Response
Olsson treats Peirce’s response to skepticism in two places and construes the skeptical
argument differently in each. In Against Coherence (2005b), he adds the following premise to
the argument:
S4. If I do not know O, then I should stop believing O.
From S3 and S4 he derives:
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S5. I should stop believing O.
From S1, S2, and S4, Olsson concludes that I should stop believing I have two hands. This
reasoning applies to any of my ordinary beliefs. Hence,
UC. I should give up all my present beliefs.
UC is the “uncertainty consequence” of the skeptical argument. According to Olsson, Peirce
shows that when an inquirer is confronted with the skeptical argument, she has no reason to
doubt that she is not deceived, and can therefore remain committed to her commonsense beliefs.
The falsity of S1 then follows by S4. S4 entails that if I need not stop believing that I am not
deceived, I know that I am not deceived.
Rather than considering whether Peirce’s view shows what Olsson takes it to show,
consider the plausibility of S4. The adequacy of Olsson’s response turns on attributing S4 to the
skeptic. Olsson maintains that the skeptic is committed to S4 for the following reasons. First, it is
commonsensical. It would be strange to agree that you do not know where you parked your car,
for instance, while holding onto your belief that you parked it behind the market. Second, the
importance of the skeptical argument is not merely to suggest that we do not know many of the
things we think we know, but to have us give up beliefs we do not know. Thus, the importance of
the argument lies in UC, which is not forthcoming unless S4 is added to the skeptic’s premises.
Without S4, radical skepticism becomes “an empty exercise without any clear bearing on human
inquiry” (Olsson 2005b, 177).
The skeptic would likely reject S4. First, it is not always the case that one should
relinquish believing what one does not know. We often have very good reason to believe
something despite not knowing it. For example, astronomers currently do not, in fact, know
whether dark matter exists. But this does not mean the scientific community should simply
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abandon that belief. Otherwise anomalous gravitational effects have lead astronomers to posit
dark matter with confidence, regardless of its never having been directly detected. Other
examples are easy to find. Olsson claims the skeptical argument is “empty,” by which he seems
to mean purposeless, if it has no practical consequences. Yet, the surprising conclusion that I do
not know I have two hands is not purposeless. Its purpose is epistemic, not practical. The
conclusion that we do not know many things we normally claim to know has purchase in
challenging the justification of our beliefs, whether we make the further decision that those
beliefs are no longer suitable for guiding our actions. The importance of the skeptical argument
is not found in necessitating that we discard beliefs we do not know, but in undermining our
reasons for holding ordinary beliefs. These considerations suggest that the skeptic would deny
S4. The radical skeptical argument, then, remains standing.

4. Olsson’s Second Peircean Response
In “Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: ‘Pragmatism and Radical Doubt’” (2005a), Olsson
uses Peircean insights to challenge the original skeptical argument. Peirce suggests that we know
we are not systematically deceived. That is, S1 is false. Olsson reconstructs the argument as
follows.
First, Peirce identifies knowledge with true belief.
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Although this may seem

controversial, the view finds support in contemporary epistemology. 3 On Peirce’s account, when
one settles on a certain belief there is often no difference between belief and true belief. Inquirers
cannot both believe O and doubt O is true. Moreover, belief that O may be legitimate even if the
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believer does not possess immediate justification for O. For example, there may simply be no
good reason available for doubting the belief.
Next, Peirce observes that we begin philosophical inquiry with beliefs we already hold:
“[T]here is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, namely, the very state of mind in
which you actually find yourself at the time you do ‘set out’—a state of mind in which you are
laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed” (1905a, 167). One belief I hold when
I begin inquiry is that I am not systematically deceived about having two hands. Peirce suggests
that confronting the radical skeptical argument does not motivate me to doubt beliefs I hold
when I begin inquiry. The argument seems to be this. If I come to doubt O, it is because I have
discovered something surprising about O. 4 To discover something surprising about O is to have
an experience that suggests not-O.5 If I come to doubt I have two hands, I must have had the
surprising experience of not having two hands. Peirce suggests that we are not surprised by the
radical skeptical hypothesis. After all, on that scenario our lived experiences are
indistinguishable from the experiences we would have if we were systematically deceived.
Consequentially, the skeptical argument does not get me to doubt beliefs I hold when I begin
inquiry. This means I know that I have two hands, and therefore I know that I am not
systematically deceived. Hence, S1 is false.
There is reason to doubt this Peircean response, however. Olsson targets S1, which holds
that I do not know I am not systematically deceived. The skeptic justifies this premise by
claiming that I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being deceived. My lived
experiences are perfectly consistent with the hypothetical scenario that those experiences are
illusions. Importantly, then, the justification of S1 does not rest on the hypothetical scenario
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being true. If it did, we could falsify S1 by showing that our ordinary beliefs are true. That is
Olsson’s Peircean reply. He relies on an understanding of knowledge that renders the
justification of ordinary beliefs inessential for knowledge. However, the skeptic warrants S1 by
purporting to undermine our reasons for holding our ordinary beliefs. Since Olsson’s Peircean
account takes knowledge to be mere true belief, Olsson fails to find an adequate response to the
skeptic.

5. A New Peircean Response
A better Peircean response could be to deny S2, the claim that if I do not know that I am
not systematically deceived, then I do not know what I ordinarily claim to know. 6 Contemporary
debate about S2 focuses on exploring the epistemic closure principle. Alternatively, I suggest
that we can use Peirce’s insights to challenge the truth of the conditional. The Peircean can say it
is true that I do not know that I am not systematically deceived, but this does not undermine my
knowledge of propositions I ordinarily claim to know.
Take first the truth of the antecedent. When the skeptic reports that I do not know that I
am not being deceived, it is because I have no justification for claiming that I am not deceived.
The epistemic context of the skeptical scenario requires reasons for belief. In this context, the
possibility of error undermines the warrant of our ordinary beliefs. Insofar as the skeptic claims
that knowledge is true justified belief, then, the Peircean should accept that the skeptical context
truly undermines knowledge of ordinary beliefs.
Now turn to the falsity of the consequent. Despite not knowing that I am being deceived,
the Peircean claims, I still know that I have two hands. There is a contextual difference between
the skeptical error-possibility and ordinary error-possibilities. I know that I have two hands
6
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because the everyday epistemic context—the context in which I act on a daily basis—does not
require me to justify my beliefs against the possibility of wholesale deception. For Peirce beliefs
establish rules of action that guide behavior. For example, if I believe there is a table in front of
me, I may sit on it; and if I do not have such a belief, I would not attempt to sit. Beliefs can be
called into question by doubt. Doubt is not mere disbelief, according to Peirce, but a state that
suspends one’s ability to act on the belief in question. Doubt arises when we discover
information contrary to what we currently believe. For Peirce the aim of inquiry is to seek out
new information that will settle conflicts of belief. We must find reason to reject, modify, or
bolster beliefs called into doubt.
If Peirce’s view of inquiry is plausible, there is reason to think that we need not justify
our beliefs in the face of the skeptical challenge. The skeptical scenario does not induce a state
where we suspend acting on our ordinary beliefs such that we are required to reject, alter, or
further support those beliefs. To induce such a state of doubt, the skeptic would have to present
information that could serve as evidence for the skeptical proposal. But the skeptical hypothesis
is justified because there appears to be no such evidence. By hypothesis, lived experiences are
symmetrical with artificial ones. One might think that encountering the skeptical hypothesis
itself will motivate doubt. But this cannot be right. The skeptical hypothesis is a mere logical
possibility, and logical possibility alone does not appear to be a sufficient reason to suspend
action. For Peirce, then, the context in which we act out our lives does not require us to warrant
beliefs against the skeptic. In the practical context, I know I have two hands. Thus, S2 is false.
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6. Avoiding Problems with Contextualism
My Peircean response to radical skepticism appears to be a traditional contextualist one.
The traditional contextualist holds that we have knowledge of commonsense propositions in
everyday contexts, but not in contexts in which radical skeptical worries about error have been
raised. The contextualist claims that skepticism is compelling under the conditions of
philosophical reflection, but not in everyday life. The Peircean response I advance, however,
avoids two major difficulties with the traditional contextualist response.
The first difficulty that confronts traditional contextualism is that it must provide an
account of what constitutes a change in epistemic contexts. My account sweeps away the
problem. The Peircean is not required to give an explanation of a shift in epistemic contexts. In
all contexts, the Peircean will accept that we cannot justify that we are not systematically
deceived, but add that such justification does threaten our knowledge of ordinary propositions.
The worry about context change only holds for accounts that attempt to falsify S1. The
contextualist claims that S1 tacitly assumes two contexts of knowledge, one high and one low,
determine whether one is being deceived. We have knowledge of propositions in low standards
contexts, like the corner store, but not in more demanding contexts, like the philosophy
classroom. The problem for the contextualist is that the skeptic holds that even in low standards
contexts ordinary knowledge claims are false—that we have no knowledge tout court. Targeting
S2 sidesteps this difficulty. For Peirce we act out our lives in both low and high standards
contexts. Thus, neither context turns over to the skeptic.
The second problem with traditional contextualism is that it arguably legitimizes the
concern that the skeptic’s standards are the best ones, and so we lack knowledge after all. The
philosophical context appears to be the more demanding and rigorous one, not the everyday one.

8

The skeptic seems to be using a more precise and correct standard for assessing knowledge
claims. The Peircean response to this worry is that the division between the context that
knowledge requires justification and the context that knowledge requires mere true belief does
not legitimize the skeptical context as the correct one. The fact that the skeptical hypothesis
undermines the justification of our beliefs is itself no reason to give that context the upper hand.
The Peircean would argue that, if anything, the fact that the hypothetical skeptical scenario
provides no reason for altering our behavior undercuts its legitimacy as the preferred epistemic
context. Assuming that our beliefs function to guide inquiry, the skeptical error-possibility has
no affect on our beliefs.

7. Conclusion
Let me take stock and conclude. I first challenged Olsson’s responses to the radical
skeptic. In one case, he claims the skeptic should hold a premise that, on my view, the skeptic
should deny. In another case, he fails to see that Peirce’s view that knowledge is mere true belief
will not faze the skeptic who holds that the hypothetical scenario undermines reasons for belief.
Olsson’s mistake is to use Peirce’s work to falsify S1. However, the Peircean should falsify S2.
There is indeed no justifying our beliefs against the possibility of deception. But knowledge in
the context in which we act does not require such justification: reasons are crucial only when
presented evidence that counters our beliefs, and the skeptical argument does not provide such
evidence. This response has advantages over two common problems with the traditional
contextualist response. First, it eschews having to explain what constitutes a change from
everyday to skeptical epistemic contexts. Second, it does not suggest that the skeptical context is
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the correct one. For these reasons, the Peircean account developed here provides a strong
response to the radical skeptic.
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